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History is inevitably involved in our philosophical reflections about 
human nature and destiny. Yet in the past, philosophy has had an 
uneasy and questionable relationship to history. In this paper I would 
like to examine seven paradigmatic cases which hopefully will illustrate 
some crucial aspects o f the past relationships between history and 
philosophy. Ideally, we can then prepare the way for a clearer insight 
into one o f the themes in the philosophy of history, i.e., philosophy’s 
ability to illuminate the nature o f historical inquiry and man’s existence 
in historical time.
Let us first attend to the definition of the terms in the title of this 
paper: history and negation. The attempt to derive a definition of  
history from its Greek etymology (toropia) has lost force because the 
sense of the word as inquiry or narration has evaporated before the 
more complicated demands o f more recent methodology. For example, 
in Hegel’s Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (1830) the term history would 
indicate (1) the scholarly activity o f inquiry into the past; (2) the 
narration o f past events; (3) the past events themselves. Any definition 
of history, then, would seem to be required to distinguish the study, 
method, and narration o f the past (Histone) and the actual past events 
themselves (Geschichte). In this paper I shall refer to all o f these senses 
of the term. Hopefully, the context o f my uses will indicate the sense 
that I mean. In addition, however, I will suppose another use developed 
by recent historicism and phenomenology, i.e., Geschichtlichkeit or 
historicity, which refers to the way man is in time and to the way man is 
understood in time by an interpreter. By the phrase ‘negation o f history’
I want to refer to the material or pre-selected philosophical paradigm 
cases when there is a tendency for these cases to distort, cancel, repress, 
or ignore the actuality of the historical past, or to attempt to under­
stand the past by exclusively philosophical means, or to claim method­
ological or ideological priority over the field of historical explanation.
For our first paradigm, I would like to examine the philosophy of 
Plato in the context o f the previous pre-Socratic philosophy, and then to 
contrast his ideas to the historiography of Thucydides. Fundamentally, 
the pre-Socratic philosophers had asked the question, “What is, re­
ally?” This question was always posed in the context o f arche or the 
originary and fundamental explanatory principle o f the world, e.g.,
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matter, number, etc. This early search for the first explanatory principle 
o f things was a “rational” endeavor because it always demanded of the 
early physical philosophers that their explanations o f the world be 
presented in discursive, logical, and objective form. When the question 
of arche was posed, the search was always for a universal and reasoned 
explanation of the multiplicity o f  sense phenomena. Explanation from 
the materials o f myth, opinion, authority, or popular cultural condi­
tioning was ruled out from the beginning.
The pre-Socratic philosophers’ inquiry into the arche had an impor­
tant consequence for the historical sense o f  things, for their researches 
would tend to replace the traditional Greek cosmogonic explanation of 
the origin o f the universe with a cosmological explanation. By cosmog­
ony, we refer to the mythopoetic account o f the origin o f the universe 
and the gods. Cosmology refers here, on the other hand, to the study of 
the first metaphysical principles o f  the universe. Cosmogony was the 
first form o f Greek historical-genetic explanation. While the cosmogic- 
mythopoetic tendency will persist even through the writing o f Herodo­
tus, the orientation o f early philosophy was usually cosmological in the 
sense that it searched for the eternal, transphenomenal arche o f  the 
world. The mythopoetic concern to account for the original and devel­
opment o f the gods and nature (such as Hesiod’s Theogony) tended to 
lose force. Even at the beginning o f Greek philosophy, then, the search 
for the first principles o f cosmology tended to be disjoined from a 
genetic or temporal account o f  things.
It was from Parmenides especially that Plato received the notion that 
the real is known only by reason, that it is changeless and self-sufficient, 
and that the unreal is changing and sensate. Science (episteme) for Plato 
was the understanding o f the objective, fundamental meaning struc­
tures (eide) which were Plato’s equivalent o f the Parmenidean reality. 
The eide were known by reason, were changeless, and were the princi­
ples by which the temporal-physical world were explained. Reality, for 
Plato, then was inherently trans-temporal.
We must note, too, that Plato had also generated a new and revolu­
tionary meaning for the traditional Greek idea o f physis, or that which 
‘is’ by the order of nature. For Plato, the traditional physis o f the older 
physical philosophers was an example o f  materialism without norma­
tive or purposeful structure. In the socio-historical realm, Plato’s phi­
losophy revolutionized the term to designate the ideal nature o f  man— 
the natural potential o f both polis and individual. Plato’s Physis was 
contrasted to the radical sophist’s use o f the term. But like the sophists, 
he would contrast the term against the notion o f nomos (custom or 
opinion). Plato’s physis referred to the fact that man, culture, and 
virtues contained an ideal potential for full growth or development.
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Such ideal possibilities stood in contrast to the normal mass opinions 
(nomoi) about the nature and value o f things. In the Republic, for 
example, Plato defined justice as the rendering to man o f what is his 
due by nature, not social convention or authority. Justice is ‘by nature’ 
when a society exists in which each member can fulfill his or her innate 
potential in the polis by means of proper education (paideia).
This conception has fateful implications for both society and history. 
Philosophy for Plato became, in part at least, joined to a praxis o f  
social control and reconstruction after the patterns o f the forms. Plato 
subverted common sense experience, values and traditions—the world 
of nomos—by means o f philosophy in the hands o f guardians. Exem­
plification o f this trend is found in Plato’s critique o f the traditional 
Greek virtues {arete) in the early and middle dialogues. Plato there 
searched for the eidos o f arete, the fundamental meaning structure o f  
the virtues. The traditional Greek opinions about these matters were 
seen by Plato as only “passing fair.” The task o f philosophy was to reval 
the true nature or form o f such virtues as justice and to institute the 
form into the social order. This implies that the world of socio-historical 
becoming and opinion must be brought into conformity with the ra­
tional and moral standards revealed by philosophy. The philosophic 
conception o f sociohistorical life is modeled after the real order laid up 
in heaven. In this manner, the ideal nature (physis) is actualized in 
historical time. The empirical or actual orders o f society remaining in 
the world belong only to the order o f nomos. They are but the empirical 
residue o f the true polis and as such as subject to the perpetual cycles o f  
generation and decay. The endurance o f  the ideal society would repre­
sent for Plato the arrest o f history.
The point to follow here is that Plato accounts for the order of 
society in time with a methodology o f  metaphysical principles (arche). 
These principles, however, have normative content, and they act as 
paradigms for social and moral transformation. They are principles 
which are meant to apply to the social-historical flux and control it 
under the aegis o f the philosopher king. I would now like to contrast 
this philosophical-historical method, if  we may call it that, to a contem­
porary development in historiography and social science—that of Thu­
cydides.
Thucydides’ conception o f history and social science is best under­
stood for our purposes, I believe, by relating him to an empirical 
tendency in Greek thought which began with Hippocratic Greek medi­
cine (460-377). For Hippocrates, human disease was not seen as the 
result o f divine retribution, but as a product o f  natural causes. The end 
o f reason or natural philosophy was not the search for the first princi­
ples o f existence (arche). Instead, medicine was the search for the order
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o f secondary material cause and effect relations in human physiology. 
The first stage o f his method he called diagnosis, or the attempt to infer 
empirically the nature o f causes from the symptoms o f a disease. The 
second stage, prognosis, was the predictive element in his method, i.e., 
it was the attempt to foretell the probable course o f the disease’s 
development. Therapy was the attempt to restore health and deflect a 
disease’s prognosis by natural medication. Here, as in other areas of 
Greek thought, some early principles o f induction and predictive anal­
ysis were established.
Hippocrates’ influence on Thucydides is apparent in his History o f  
the Peloponnesian War. For example, in Book II o f  the History, Thucy­
dides provided an analysis o f  the Athenian plague. Here, his attempt 
was to diagnose not only the physical but the social symptoms o f a 
plague situation. He then attempted to provide a historical analysis or 
prognosis o f the development of psychological, moral, and social con­
sequences o f a plague situation in a civil society at war. His principles of 
explanation were not derived from the first principles o f  being, but 
from the probable and secondary facts o f empirical nature. Also, as in 
other places, Thucydides attempted to provide a diagnosis and prog­
nosis as a model o f human behavior to be used by statesmen and 
scholars for understanding the probable behavior o f the masses given 
certain historical conditions. History was not only placed outside of 
metaphysics, but also it was placed in a purely indicative mode of 
understanding, i.e., it indicates what is the case in the mundane world, 
and it is seen under the aegis o f factual interpretation, hypothesis 
formation, and empirical prediction.
The Thucydidean model o f historical explanation was also in the 
indicative mode in still another sense: the claim to value neutrality. By 
this Thucydides meant that no trans-temporal or preferred values can 
be assumed in or imposed on history. For example, in the famous 
“Melian Dialogues” between the citizens o f a weak polis and imperial 
Athenian generals, who were about to invade Melos, the only relevant 
standards o f justice assumed by Thucydides belonged to an order of 
facts, an indicative order that postulates only what is, not what ought to 
be. It is the nature (physis) o f  man, he assumed, for the stronger to seek 
power over the weaker. The Melians were destroyed because they were 
weaker. They were not saved by their argumentative appeals to any 
normative standards of justice. For Thucydides, then, the nature (phy­
sis) o f  justice is exhausted by factual description o f  a situation and a 
delineation o f probable development. Not only is Plato’s imposition of  
a prescriptive order o f values negated from the realm o f proper history, 
but his attempt to grasp socio-historical existence by reference to the 
first principles of being is also rejected. History belongs exclusively to
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the secondary order o f natural causation. At this point we see that, at 
least in these paradigmatic cases, the methods and assumptions of 
history and philosophy were significantly disjoined in the Greek world. 
Thucydides’ model exemplified the negation of either a platonic or 
normative-imperative methodology from empirical historiography for 
over 2000 years. Plato, on the other hand, provided no adequate 
method for dealing with empirical history.
In our second example, St. Augustine’s philosophy o f history, the 
relation between philosophy and history took a different form. In this 
case, history was examined under the aegis of philosophical theology. 
St. Augustine attempted the construction o f a historical monogenism, 
i.e., the attempt to identify a single, essential cause of historical devel­
opment. For Augustine, this cause was God guiding the world accord­
ing to providence. Augustine understood history as a progressive and 
linear revelation o f God’s will as it had been revealed to the Hebrew 
prophets and on up to the Christian era. Here, for the first time in the 
philosophy o f history, linear progress is expressed and understood in the 
context o f  progressive revelation.
Augustine added an element o f  apologetics to his historical material. 
Foremost in his mind when he wrote The City o f God was Alaric’s sack 
of Rome in 410 A .D . Augustine attempted to account for this tragedy 
to contemporary Christians, first, by an appeal to God’s providence 
and, second, by his creation of a bifurcated model of historical explana­
tion. Augustine argued that the fall o f Rome should not lead to a loss of 
Christian faith, because history is divided into “divine” and “secular” 
parts. Divine history, which he often expressed as the “City o f  God,” is 
the story o f God’s elect from the ancient prophets to the present 
Christian citizens o f Rome. These elect participants, in history are 
characterized by the love o f  God. Secular or profane history is com­
posed o f actors whose chief characteristic is the love of self. The will of 
this latter class is unredeemed by God’s Grace. For Augustine, the 
inevitable historical fate o f such a people is the fall of Rome, a city 
vitiated by ungodliness. On the other hand, the end of the divine city is 
salvation.
For Augustine, the history o f the secular world was non-essential 
history, i.e. it was not the main vehicle which advanced his monogenis- 
tic theme. Also, a secular analysis o f  the causes o f Rome’s fall was not 
central to him. Indeed, the tools o f secular historiography were little 
developed in Augustine’s writings at all. The center of his monogenism 
was the development o f  the divine city. This tendency is illustrated in his 
uniquely Christian and linear notion of historical development. In a 
famous phrase in his City o f  God, he tells us that the Christian world 
“will no longer walk in circles.”
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By this phrase, he meant that the Greek historical cycles of genera­
tion and decay will not obtain in divine history. God’s providence and 
salvation are not “mere caprice,” but the unfolding of salvation. The 
story of history is the progressive unfolding of his will as given in 
revelation, and the end of divine history is salvation of the elect. Also, 
human will in the divine city is aided by God’s grace and is directed to 
the end of salvation.
Even given this brief and inadequate sketch of Augustine’s historical 
thought, we can draw from it some rather pronounced implications. 
First, we can note that Thucydides’ naturalistic model of explanation 
and second-order causation analysis were negated as non-essential to 
Augustine’s Christian Weltanschauung. Indeed, as we have noted 
above, little fundamental development of secular historiography 
emerged from him. Also implicit in Augustine’s philosophy of history 
was his rejection of the importance of praxis from secular history. 
Praxis as a means of the secular and linear improvement of man’s 
historical condition is non-efficacious and irrelevant to the center of 
divine history, whose end is advanced by Grace. For Augustine, the 
human will is free, but it is vitiated since the fall. It cannot, as he argued 
against Pelagius, lead to the essential and proper end of historical man,
i.e., the City of God. Finally, Augustine’s philosophy of history reflects 
a disjunction between nature and divinity, a disjunction that is already 
implicit in his doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Two levels of historical 
understanding are generated—the divine and the secular. But the secular 
dimension is actually non-essential and inferior. The implication here is 
that secular history, the history in which most of us live, is negated into 
a secondary and even illusory status. It is unredeemed and hopeless in 
its possibilities of development.
A third case, and perhaps the most important example so far, must 
be seen in the context of the rise of mathematical science in the seven­
teenth century. While it is difficult or impossible to characterize a whole 
movement such as this, I believe that we can make the following claims 
about it. The world was considered in this movement to be composed of 
material bodies whose motion and relations could be expressed mathe­
matically as “the laws of nature.” Given any physical cause, such as the 
gravitational influence of one body on another, there could be deter­
mined an effect such as the mathematically predictable orbit of a planet 
around the sun. Physical phenomena, when so understood, were usu­
ally believed to exhibit in their motion the same necessity that axioms 
bear to theorems. In addition, nature was considered to have a true 
status which could be expressed in terms of the so-called “primary 
qualities,” namely weight, velocity, figure, position, magnitude, and 
number. These properties were believed to be the essence of matter in
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that they express the external world as it is in itself apart from its 
perceptual and subjective appearance to man. Conversely, ordinary 
sense experiences, that is, the perceptible qualities of physical things 
such as colors and smells, were termed “secondary qualities” of experi­
ence and nature. They are secondary in the sense that they are merely 
the subjectively mediated appearance of nature as it is in its primary 
state. For example, Galileo believed that our ordinary perception of 
heat is a secondary state of illusion. The primary or real status of heat is 
nothing but the friction of elementary atomic bodies. For him the 
designation “reality” could only be applied to the primary state.
It is in Descartes that we first feel the impact of these premises for 
the historical and social studies. In his Discourse On Method and 
Meditations o f First Philosophy, he claimed that the status of these 
subjects was sub-rational because of their subjectivity, their lack of a 
universally valid method, and lack of certainty. Descartes saw correctly 
that these studies provided no universally valid method for the discov­
ery of self-evident and deductively ordered truths. He would advocate 
what can be called a monomethodological approach to knowledge, i.e., 
there is but one method of reasoned inquiry into the natural world. This 
method is the mathematical comprehension of nature in its primary 
status. The secondary or qualitative states of experience would be 
equated with the illusions of subjectivity.
It is not an accident that Descartes’ mathesis universalis makes no 
provisions for the sociohistorical studies. Indeed, the implications of his 
assumptions and methods are fatal to them. Their very material in­
volves human subjectivity and secondary qualitative states. Such sub­
jects as history cannot be explicated in clear and distinct, self-evident, 
or purely quantitative conceptions perse, nor can they be reduced to the 
primary qualities of the res extensa without eliminating everything the 
sociohistorical world is about—deliberate actions, emotions, first per­
son states, ordinary sense data, cultural symbolizations, records and 
artifacts, and the significance of ordinary language. In short, because 
Descartes’ monometholology and presuppositions about reality are in­
compatible with sociohistorical attributes, he was forced to confine the 
sociohistorical world to a merely subjective or subrational status. And 
this he did. History—its methods and materials—was negated by its 
relegation to the sub-rational and sub-real world.
Our fourth case is an instance of revolution in ideas, a revolution 
perpetrated by an obscure Italian genius whose importance, until re­
cently, has gone largely unrecognized. Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) 
seized upon the problem of the status and method of the sociohistorical 
studies and created a tradition which is still in the process of unfolding 
in such diverse areas as ordinary language philosophy, James Joyce,
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Jean Piaget, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and phenomenology.
Vico held that a novel approach, a “new science,” must be created to 
penetrate the “thick darkness” which obscures human life in its individ­
ual, social, and historical dimensions. In his On the Study Methods of 
Our Time and The New Science, he would respond to what he consid­
ered to be the Cartesian rejection of the so-called Verisimilar notion of 
truth. By this term, he indicated that a valid method for the interpreta­
tion of ordinary life and its creations is possible. Vico was aware that 
the humanistic tradition of philosophy had recognized the need for such 
a doctrine. In Aristotle, for example, there was phronesis or practical 
wisdom. By this conception, Aristotle would provide to the mind a 
means for explaining the practical, common sense disciplines of politics 
and rhetoric. Vico believed that the rise of science and Cartesianism had 
subverted this epistemological category. Cartesianism had granted epi- 
stemic priority and exclusiveness to what Aristotle had reserved for 
theoria, that is, the purely abstract faculty which cognizes metaphysics, 
mathematics and physics.
For Vico, Cartesianism had never achieved a true unity of method, 
but only a species of it, i.e., the mathematical-deductive attempt to 
formulate the laws of external nature. In order to provide an under­
standing of the sociohistorical world, Vico would advance a formula 
for the nature of truth which he styled verum et factum convertuntur. 
This formula claims that truth converts into the creations and actions of 
human beings.
Hopefully, this conception can be elucidated as follows. For Vico, 
God is immanent in nature and understands its logos as a creation of 
His own being. But man can only understand nature externally through 
sense experience and hypothesis formation. The innermost parts of 
nature remain unknowable to Man because he did not make nature. In 
the sociohistorical world, however, knowledge is attainable because the 
sociohistorical world is a human creation. Man is the cause of his own 
cultural effects, and the principles of these effects “are found in the 
modification of his own mind.” But how can we clarify and exemplify 
this seemingly obscure notion in Vico?
I would propose that for Vico the created human world has two 
aspects. We can note examples from Vico himself: the overt physical 
motions that attend an action (the physical sound waves of a speech act, 
the ink and paper of a classical document) are the sensate, physical or 
‘outer’ side of these creations; but the ‘outer’ physical features are not 
sufficient conditions for a complete understanding of the actions and 
creations in question. It is true, of course, that human creations and 
actions must take some material embodiment, but we must note that the 
concept of culture has what today we would call an intentional aspect: it
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is constituted as meaning and value laden, and as expressing human 
purpose. Culture is always significant beyond its outer physical aspects. 
For Vico, the establishment of the fundamental and universal principles 
of culture must be derived from the humanly constituted meaning of 
human creations. This is the purpose of his New Science.
The human mind had previously tried to understand itself by refer­
ence to external bodies. But for Vico, the mind can only understand 
true nature by self-reflection. In the case of language, Vico argued that 
the mind first understands its verbal creations only by reference to 
physical bodies. Subsequently, it comes to reflect on its own activity by 
attention to the symbols which express the significance we assign to 
objects. Natural languages are for Vico expressions of a common 
mental structure which provides the basis of intersubjectivity in the 
human world. The verum est factum formula is the assertion that the 
knowing and the being of the cultural world are unified because in 
human making {factum) the agent self-consciously performs the subjec­
tive symbolic operations that constitute the meaning of his making. We 
can be said to understand the creations of the human world when we 
can self-consciously refer to the states of awareness that constitute the 
meaning of any creation. The innermost being of the human world is 
understandable because the consciousness which recognizes itself in the 
object is the cause of the intelligibility in the objects made.
For Vico, history is human creation and action in time. It is a 
product {factum) of man. Its method of interpretation is autonomous 
in the sense that its maker is its interpretor. Its status is not subrational 
or external to our knowing faculty. Nor are its explanational devices 
derived from a subject matter foreign to its nature. The philosophy of 
historical immanence is here established for the first time. Vico at­
tempted to negate the negation of the historical world by Descartes. 
History was seen to have its own methods and subject matter. The force 
of Vico’s position were largely ignored by philosophy until the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Its position was negated in the sense that 
it was forgotten.
In Hegel’s philosophy of history, our fifth paradigm, the doctrine of 
historical immanence was confined to the indwelling possibility of 
consciousness in historical time. But the promise of Vico’s verum et 
factum method was not retained. Instead, historical process and its 
meaning were to be understood by reference to first principles, by a 
return to the doctrine of nous as the cause of world order. In the 
Lectures on the Philosophy o f History, Hegel cited the text of Plato’s 
Phaedo from 99 d to 101 d (pp. 11 ff., Sibree trans.) Here, Socrates was 
described as disappointed to find that Anaxagoras’s nous provided 
reason to nature only insofar as it was a description of external material
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causes. Plato’s Socrates wanted to overcome Anaxagoras’s purportedly 
inadequate explanation of nature in terms of mechanical causes. To 
effect this end, Socrates posited the existence of the forms as the 
strongest logoi of explanation, and he had Socrates understand nous as 
that principle which arranges nature “for the best.”
Hegel asserted that his positing of “reason in history” would ad­
vance historical understanding to the extent that the Phaedo’s notion of 
nous was a turning point in the philosophy of nature. Hegel claimed 
that history, too, must be comprehended by reason, for nous is manifest 
in history as well as nature. Hegel wanted to show that reason is 
consciousness determining itself in absolute freedom in historical time. 
For Hegel, the mere cause and effect or descriptive narration of the past 
fails to show necessity, goal, or reason in history. The sole thought 
which philosophy brings to history is the concept that reason is the law 
of the world. Reason transforms history in its ability to actualize the 
ideal, to effect the ‘ought’ or the imperative mode by the achievement 
of freedom and self-consciousness in progressive stages of historical 
time. Hegel’s philosophy of history tried to illustrate progressive stages 
of reason’s development in time.
The issue which Hegel brought to history was not a new competence 
in historiography, but a new reality principle. While he denied that his 
method was simply an a priori means of explanation, Hegel, like Plato 
before him, appealed to the highest order of cause which can “arrange 
things for the best” in historical time. This was the recrudescence of 
nous or reason. I believe that one may apply the term “negation of 
history” to Hegel’s thought in the following senses: (1) historians such 
as Ranke, Burckhardt, Mommsen, Bury, Meinecke, Trevelyan, 
Huizinga, Henry Adams, G. P. Gooch and others have claimed that 
Hegel’s “reason in history” is methodologically unhelpful and mislead­
ing with respect to the historical materials with which it deals; (2) 
historical time does not reveal a clear progress of either reason or 
freedom, so his method leads to a distortion of progressive chronology, 
when for example the Crusades is seen as a higher expression of 
development than Greece; (3) Hegel’s treatment virtually excludes the 
historicity of the non-Western world; and (4) the notion of the “cunning 
of reason” has not adequately eludicated the irrational, selfish, or 
unintended consequences of human action.
While Hegel’s philosophy of history has largely evaporated from the 
theory and practice of professional historians, the historical claims of 
Karl Marx arouse passions everywhere, and his influence is manifestly 
apparent in a variety of schools and individuals. Eager partisanship on 
the one hand and strong antipathy on the other help make a fair and 
full treatment of his views difficult in a limited time. Here, as in the
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paradigm case of Hegel, I will attempt nothing like a full statement or 
analysis of Marx’s theory of history. However, some elements of his 
position must be mentioned.
1. Hegel’s idealist metaphysics—the view that substance is subject, that 
the universe is the self-expression of spirit and reason—was entirely 
implausible to Marx. For him, matter had ontological, causal, and 
temporal precedence over mind. However, Marx did accept from 
Hegel the dialectical method for the interpretation of reality. But he 
accepted dialectical method not because it answers to the nature of 
thought, but because it answers, he believed, to the nature of things.
2. Marx borrowed from Hegel the notion that the different aspects of 
society are organically related in time. But for Marx, the principle of 
organic connection was not objective spirit, but the economic con­
stituents that render social and political affairs connected and ex­
plainable.
3. For Marx, the historical task became directed toward explaining 
how economic or class structures have evolved with respect to the 
various historical solutions to the problem of production.
4. History must record how the forces of production negate existing 
economic and social arrangements in order to provide a rationale for 
radical social change. Indeed, the end of history is to record the 
progress of man to an end, i.e., a classless, stateless, and free 
communistic society.
But our account of Marx thus far is incomplete, for it neglects 
Marx’s relation to the empirical tradition of the Enlightenment, i.e., to 
the utilitarians, and the classical liberal schools. From these sources, he 
inherited the belief that history not only must exhibit an empirical and 
predictive character, but that history must be controlled and changed. 
Passive understanding of history is not enough. The point is to change 
it. Also, a speculative philosophy of history which records the stages of 
intelligibility of human consciousness in time is inadequate. Rather, for 
Marx, the explanatory horizon for all historical explanation is the 
empirical economic background through which concepts become mean­
ingful and related. For Marx, this theory of explanation is evidence of 
his negation of Hegel’s a priori method in the dialectic. But, like Hegel, 
Marx wanted to join a notion of methodological empiricism to the 
imperative or normative mode. This is to say that the development of 
history, when joined to revolutionary action, is essentially towards a 
desirable goal, i.e., the communist social order.
At this point, I would like to address myself to the question of how 
Marxism, or at least its exemplification in contemporary regimes, re­
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lates to the problem of the negation of history. Marxist regimes or 
practitioners negate history if  the following conditions obtain:
1. when Marxist economic determination becomes simply a purport­
edly empirical surrogate for Hegel’s nous; i.e., a single factor anal­
ysis of all historical reality in terms of a method which is exclusive 
and reductionistic;
2. when alternative hypotheses about the causal relations that might 
obtain between consciousness, economic action, and the historical 
milieu (such as that of Max Weber’s) are dismissed a priori as false 
consciousness, i.e., as non-complementary to materialistic presup­
position, and Marxist ideology;
3. when Marxist idologists reject an alternative approach only because 
it is hostile or neutral towards Marxist assumptions of the proper 
end of history as classless, collectivistic, and free; this is to say that 
there may be valid approaches to history which do not assume the 
methodological unity of fact and value, and reject the norms of 
self-fulfilling prophecy;
4. when a regime demands an exclusive intellectual and moral alle­
giance to the Marxist state in scholarship or social behavior, and 
demands legitimation of its previously imposed institutions and 
hierarchies; for example, the Polish Communist Party Chief 
Stanislaw Kania argued from the standpoint of his state Marxism 
that the Solidarity movement is essentially anti-historical; Soviet 
authorities called it counterrevolutionary and, therefore, anti-histor­
ical; recently the underground Solidarity movement, Young Poland, 
has advocated a published text, Truth-in-History, on the relations 
between Poland and Russia; this can only mean that action or 
thought which is considered discomplementary to establish power is 
negated as valid historical matter;
5. finally, when there is a tendency in at least some Marxist trends to 
create and sanctify a historical bifurcation between ideal and real 
Marxism, and in so doing to attempt to disassociate a merely idea­
tional Marxism from given historical realities.
The negation of history exists here in a refusal even to consider a 
possible relation between Marxist theory and the negative positivity of 
historical results. For example, the tendency towards centralization of 
power, in one case at least, has resulted in a Stalin. The idealist interpre­
tation of this development is the instant assumption that there is no 
association to be found between Marxist presuppositions and historical 
results. Or, apologists will explain such facts as purely aberrational, or 
merely instances of the “evil man” theory of historical possibility. Any
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hypothesis as to whether there is an essential tendency in statist theory 
to generate absolute and self-serving power is negated from the begin­
ning.
In our final paradigm case, I would like to consider some of the 
thinking of Martin Heidegger. In Heidegger’s thought the notion of 
historical immanence from Vico and historicity of life in Dihhey have 
been combined into the notion of the radical historicity of human being 
(Daseiri). This means that man is not a substance, for a substance is a 
thing, “an objectified presence” in Heideggerian analysis of existence 
indicates that the self is not a ready-made condition but a state of 
existence to be gained or lost in historical time. Heidegger’s model of 
man involves radical historicity of human existence, because the three 
dimensions of temporality—past, present, and what will be—are correl­
ated to the essential structure of life as care (die Sorge), i.e., possibility 
or the projection of what is to come, facticity (the taking over of what 
has been) and falling (the concern with the present).
Heidegger’s concept of human being as radical historicity allowed 
him to distinguish between man and thing. The thing endures through 
time, but its relation to time is that of a kind of moving from one now 
to another, an external relation. But human being (Dasein) is not 
confined to the now. It projects its possibilities to the future and it is 
responsible for the past. Man is not merely in time, but he has time and 
takes time as one of his essential attributes. Indeed, his very being is 
only possible in the horizon of time. Man appropriates that which is 
ahead and that which has been; and the unity of a future which becomes 
the present from the process of having been is temporality. It is because 
of man’s essential historicality that he can understand the past. Heideg­
ger’s notion of historicity follows Dilthey, who distinguished between 
the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften in order to illus­
trate that in the latter we create and participate in their subject matter. 
Their content is the historical creation of human being in time.
Heidegger developed the being of man as a regional ontology. As 
such, his considerations were intended to introduce us to the so-called 
problem of being itself. This is to say that the inquiry into the being of 
man was not conducted for its own sake, but as a means for entering 
into the question of being per se. This second phase—sometimes called 
“the turning”—was concerned with Being itself, and man is to be 
understood secondarily in the light of Being. The later Heidegger advo­
cated a passive or receptive attitude to the unconcealment of Being. 
Philosophy became the hermeneutics of being. This mode of doing 
philosophy is distinguished from what Heidegger believed was a mis­
conception in the West, i.e., the tendency to think of being as a thing, as 
essence, as a presence at hand. In this respect, Nietzche’s thought
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represented an essentialistic concept of being as the will to power and 
domination in the form of technology. The problem of nihilism is 
inseparable from the problem of being here, because nihilism is the 
attempt to master beings and to forget Being. From this present impasse 
we can only wait to be delivered, wait for a new revelation of the 
meaning of being. This attitude seems to me to stand in contrast to the 
earlier Heidegger’s emphasis on human responsibility for the appropria­
tion of the future, for the creation of history. Heidegger’s now famous 
last interview with Der Spiegel illustrates the issue. When asked about 
the future of humanity with respect to war or peace, or the possibility of 
a holocaust, Heidegger replied, “Only a god can save us.”
This understanding of things, I would suggest, is a negation of 
history in the sense that a responsible existence towards the future— 
which is after all part of man’s historicity for Heidegger—is forgotten 
or avoided. Historical time has become a kind of waiting, an enduring. 
It is from this situation that the present “terror of history” emerges. By 
this phrase, I refer to any posture of helplessness or waiting for a 
destiny that is beyond human control. If it is the fate of contemporary 
man to retreat into passivity, terror, or waiting for the dispensation of 
being, has he not approached the status of an object among object, an 
object who does not appropriate the future of his own-ness? Here, in 
Heidegger, the most immanent of historical philosophies seems to ne­
gate the very responsibility, praxis, or authenticity implied in the doc­
trine of radical historical immanence.
In closing, I would like to note, as I am sure you have noted, that 
many relations between philosophy and history have gone unaddressed. 
My purpose, however, has not been to present an exhaustive summary, 
but to suggest some problems, i.e., that philosophy either as a method 
or doctrine maintains a problematic relation to history, that one task of 
contemporary philosophy might be an analysis, elucidation and resolu­
tion of the issues that have emerged from our analysis: (1) the order of 
causation in history has been disjoined, in significant part, from both 
philosophical and scientific methods since Plato; (2) an a-historical 
philosophical theology such as that of St. Augustine can swallow the 
efficacy of human praxis into eternity; (3) a nomothetic reductionism in 
the form of monomethodology will tend to subserve history into nature 
and negate even the possibility of an idiographic method for the under­
standing of sociohistorical being; (4) philosophical theories of historical 
immanence can become messianic and pretend to knowledge of the 
final meaning of history without recourse to the demands of empirical 
methods or independent criticism; at the same time such historical 
theses can provide the rationale for political domination and intellectual 
subservience; (5) finally, if philosophical inquiry, criticism, ontology, or
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normative prescription are divorced from the historical Lebenswelt, 
then philosophy, along with other disciplines, becomes a mere spectator 
of history.
Indeed, individuals are captives of history when they float along 
with its currents and trust to historical drift in the face of holocaust. 
The apparent lack of the recognition of man’s radical historicity and his 
implied responsibility for his future are the ghosts that haunt contempo­
rary philosophy. To be in the flux, to be the flux, are the very marks of 
humanity. While these marks are a sign of human finitude, are they not 
also signs of man’s grandeur, of his possibility for the future and the 
promotion of intelligence in the modern world?
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